Category Archives: Human Genetic Engineering

There has beenno scientific findingthat the novel coronavirus was bioengineered, but its origins are not entirely clear. Deadly pathogens discovered in the wild are sometimesstudied inlabs and sometimes made more dangerous. That possibility, and other plausible scenarios, have been incorrectly dismissed in remarks by some scientists andgovernment officials, and in the coverage of most major media outlets.

Regardless of the source of this pandemic, there is considerable documentation that a global biological arms race going on outside of public view could produce even more deadly pandemics in the future.

While much of the media and political establishment have minimized the threat from such lab work, some hawks on the American right like Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., have singled outChinese biodefense researchers as uniquely dangerous.

But there is every indication that U.S. lab work is every bit as threatening as that in Chinese labs. American labs also operate insecret, and are also known to beaccident-prone.

The current dynamics of the biological arms race have been driven by U.S. government decisions that extend back decades. In December 2009, Reuters reported that the Obama administration was refusing even to negotiate the possible monitoring of biological weapons.

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Much of the left in the U.S. now appears unwilling to scrutinize the origin of the pandemic or the wider issue of biowarfare perhaps because portions of the anti-Chinese right have been sovocal in making unfoundedallegations.

Governments that participate in such biological weapon research generally distinguish between "biowarfare" and "biodefense," as if to paint such "defense" programs as necessary. But this is rhetorical sleight-of-hand; the two concepts are largely indistinguishable.

"Biodefense" implies tacit biowarfare, breeding more dangerous pathogens for the alleged purposeof finding a way tofightthem. While this work appears to have succeeded in creating deadly and infectious agents, including deadlier flu strains, such "defense" research is impotent in its ability to defend us from this pandemic.

The legal scholar who drafted the main U.S. law on the subject, Francis Boyle, warned in his 2005 book "Biowarfare and Terrorism" that an "illegal biological arms race with potentially catastrophic consequences" was underway, largely driven by the U.S. government.

For years,many scientistshave raised concerns regarding bioweapons/biodefense lab work, and specifically aboutthe fact that huge increases in funding have taken place since 9/11. This was especially true afterthe anthrax-by-mail attacks that killed five people in the weeks after 9/11, which the FBI ultimately blamed on a U.S. government biodefense scientist.A 2013 study found that biodefense funding since2001 hadtotaled at least $78 billion, and more has surely been spent since then. This has led to aproliferation of laboratories, scientists and new organisms, effectively setting off a biological arms race.

Following the Ebola outbreak in west Africa in 2014, the U.S. governmentpaused fundingfor what are known as "gain-of-function" research on certain organisms. This work actually seeks to make deadly pathogensdeadlier, in some cases making pathogens airborne thatpreviously were not. With little notice outside the field, the pause on such research was lifted in late 2017.

During this pause, exceptions for funding were made for dangerous gain-of-function lab work. This included work jointly done by U.S. scientists from the University of North Carolina, Harvard and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. This work which had funding from USAID and EcoHealth Alliance not originally acknowledged was published in2015 in Nature Medicine.

A different Nature Medicine article about the origin of the current pandemic,authored by five scientists andpublished on March 17,has been touted by major media outlet and some officials including current National Institutes of Health directorFrancis Collins as definitively disproving a lab origin for the novel coronavirus. That journal article, titled "The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2," stated unequivocally: "Our analyses clearly show that SARS-CoV-2 is not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus." This is a subtly misleading sentence. While the scientists state that there is no known laboratory "signature" in the SARS-Cov-2 RNA, their argument fails to take account of other lab methods that could have created coronavirus mutations without leaving such a signature.

Indeed, there is also thequestion of conflict of interest in the Nature Medicine article. Some of the authors of that article, as well as aFebruary 2020Lancet letter condemning "conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin" which seemed calculated to minimize outside scrutiny of biodefense lab work have troubling ties to thebiodefense complex,as well as to the U.S. government. Notably, neither of these articles makes clear that a virus can have a natural originand then be captured and studied in a controlled laboratory setting before being let loose, either intentionally or accidentallywhichis clearly a possibility in the case of the coronavirus.

Facts as "rumors"

This reporter raised questions about the subject at a news conference with a Center for Disease Control (CDC) representative at the now-shuttered National Press Club on Feb. 11. I asked if it was a "complete coincidence" that the pandemic had started in Wuhan, the only place in China with a declared biosafety level 4 (BSL4) laboratory. BSL4 laboratories have the most stringent safety mechanisms, but handle the most deadly pathogens. As I mentioned, it was oddthat the ostensible origin of the novel coronavirus was bat caves in Yunnan province more than 1,000 miles from Wuhan. I noted that "gain-of-function" lab work can results in more deadly pathogens, and that major labs, including some in the U.S., have had accidental releases.

CDC Principal Deputy Director Anne Schuchat saidthatbased on the information she had seen, the virus was of "zoonotic origin." She also stated, regarding gain-of-function lab work, that it is important to "protect researchers and their laboratory workers as well as the community around them and that we use science for the benefit of people."

I followed up by asking whether an alleged natural origin did not preclude the possibility that this virus came through a lab, since a lab could have acquired a bat virus and been working on it. Schuchat replied to the assembled journalists that "it is very common for rumors to emerge that can take on life of their own," but did not directly answer the question. She noted that in the 2014 Ebola outbreak some observers had pointed to nearby labs as the possible cause, claiming this "was a key rumor that had to be overcome in order to help control the outbreak." She reiterated: "So based on everything that I know right now, I can tell you the circumstances of the origin really look like animals-to-human. But your question, I heard."

This is no rumor. It's a fact: Labs work with dangerous pathogens. The U.S. and China each have dual-use biowarfare/biodefense programs. China has major facilities at Wuhan a biosafety level 4 lab and a biosafety level 2 lab. There are leaks from labs. (See "Preventing a Biological Arms Race," MIT Press, 1990, edited by Susan Wright; also, a partial review in Journal of International Law from October 1992.)

Much of the discussion of this deadly serious subject is marred with snark that avoids or dodges the "gain-of-function" question. ABC ran a story on March 27 titled "Sorry, Conspiracy Theorists. Study Concludes COVID-19 'Is Not a Laboratory Construct.'" That story did not address the possibility that the virus could have been found in the wild, studied in a lab and thenreleased.

On March 21, USA Today published a piece headlined "Fact Check: Did the Coronavirus Originate In a Chinese Laboratory?" and rated it "FALSE."

That USA Today story relied on the Washington Post, which publishedawidely cited article onFeb.17headlined,"Tom Cotton keeps repeating a coronavirus conspiracy theory that was already debunked." That article quoted public comments fromRutgers University professor of chemical biology Richard Ebright, but out of context and only in part. Specifically, the story quoted from Ebright's tweet that the coronavirus was not an "engineered bioweapon." In fact, his full quote included the clarification that the virus could have "entered human population through lab accident." (An email requesting clarification sent toPost reporterPaulina Firoziwas met with silence.)

Bioengineered From a lab

Other pieces in the Post since then (some heavily sourced to U.S. government officials) have conveyed Ebright's thinking, but it gets worse. In a private exchange, Ebright who, again, has said clearly that the novel coronavirus was not technically bioengineered using known coronavirus sequences stated that other forms of lab manipulation could have beenresponsible for the current pandemic. This runs counter to much reporting, which is perhaps too scientifically illiterate to perceive the difference.

In response to the suggestion that the novel coronavirus could have come about through various methodsbesides bioengineering made by Dr. Meryl Nass, who has done groundbreaking work on biowarfareEbright responded in an email:

The genome sequence of SARS-CoV-2 has no signatures of human manipulation.

This rules out the kinds of gain-of-function (GoF) research that leave signatures of human manipulation in genome sequences (e.g., use of recombinant DNA methods to construct chimeric viruses), but does not rule out kinds of GoF research that do not leave signatures (e.g., serial passage in animals). [emphasis added]

Very easy to imagine the equivalent of the Fouchier's "10 passages in ferrets" with H5N1 influenza virus, but, in this case, with 10 passages in non-human primates with bat coronavirus RaTG13 or bat coronavirus KP876546.

That last paragraph is very important. It refersto virologist Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, who performed research on intentionally increasing rates of viralmutation rate by spreading a virus from one animal to another in a sequence.The New York Times wrote about this in an editorial in January 2012, warning of "An Engineered Doomsday."

"Now scientists financed by the National Institutes of Health" have created a "virus that could kill tens or hundreds of millions of people" if it escaped confinement, the Times wrote. The story continued:

Working with ferrets, the animal that is most like humans in responding to influenza, the researchers found that a mere five genetic mutations allowed the virus to spread through the air from one ferret to another while maintaining its lethality. A separate study at the University of Wisconsin, about which little is known publicly, produced a virus that is thought to be less virulent.

The word "engineering" in the New York Times headline is technically incorrect, sincepassing a virus through animals is not "genetic engineering." This same distinction has hindered some from understanding the possible origins of the current pandemic.

Fouchier's flu work, in which an H5N1 virus was made more virulent by transmitting it repeatedly between individual ferrets, briefly sent shockwaves through the media. "Locked up in the bowels of the medical faculty building here and accessible to only a handful of scientists lies a man-made flu virus that could change world history if it were ever set free," wrote Science magazine in 2011 in a story titled "Scientists Brace for Media Storm Around Controversial Flu Studies." It continues:

The virus is an H5N1 avian influenza strain that has been genetically altered and is now easily transmissible between ferrets, the animals that most closely mimic the human response to flu. Scientists believe it's likely that the pathogen, if it emerged in nature or were released, would trigger an influenza pandemic, quite possibly with many millions of deaths.

In a 17th floor office in the same building, virologist Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center calmly explains why his team created what he says is "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make" and why he wants to publish a paper describing how they did it. Fouchier is also bracing for a media storm. After he talked to ScienceInsider yesterday, he had an appointment with an institutional press officer to chart a communication strategy.

Fouchier's paper is one of two studies that have triggered an intense debate about the limits of scientific freedom and that could portend changes in the way U.S. researchers handle so-called dual-use research: studies that have a potential public health benefit but could also be useful for nefarious purposes like biowarfare or bioterrorism.

Despite objections, Fouchier's article was published by Science in June 2012. Titled "Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets," it summarized how Fouchier's research team made the pathogen more virulent:

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus can cause morbidity and mortality in humans but thus far has not acquired the ability to be transmitted by aerosol or respiratory droplet ("airborne transmission") between humans. To address the concern that the virus could acquire this ability under natural conditions, we genetically modified A/H5N1 virus by site-directed mutagenesis and subsequent serial passage in ferrets. The genetically modified A/H5N1 virus acquired mutations during passage in ferrets, ultimately becoming airborne transmissible in ferrets.

In other words, Fouchier's research took a flu virus that did not exhibit airborne transmission, then infected a number of ferrets until it mutated to the point that it was transmissible by air.

In thatsame year, 2012, asimilar studyby Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin was published in Nature:

Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses occasionally infect humans, but currently do not transmit efficiently among humans. ... Here we assess the molecular changes ... that would allow a virus ... to be transmissible among mammals. We identified a ... virus ... with four mutations and the remaining seven gene segments from a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus that was capable of droplet transmission in a ferret model.

In 2014, Marc Lipsitch of Harvard and Alison P. Galvani of Yale wrote regarding Fouchier and Kawaoka's work:

Recent experiments that create novel, highly virulent and transmissible pathogens against which there is no human immunity are unethical ... they impose a risk of accidental and deliberate release that, if it led to extensive spread of the new agent, could cost many lives. While such a release is unlikely in a specific laboratory conducting research under strict biosafety procedures, even a low likelihood should be taken seriously, given the scale of destruction if such an unlikely event were to occur. Furthermore, the likelihood of risk is multiplied as the number of laboratories conducting such research increases around the globe.

Given this risk, ethical principles, such as those embodied in the Nuremberg Code, dictate that such experiments would be permissible only if they provide humanitarian benefits commensurate with the risk, and if these benefits cannot be achieved by less risky means.

We argue that the two main benefits claimed for these experiments improved vaccine design and improved interpretation of surveillance are unlikely to be achieved by the creation of potential pandemic pathogens (PPP), often termed "gain-of-function" (GOF) experiments.

There may be a widespread notion that there is scientific consensus that the pandemic did not come out of a lab. But in factmany of the most knowledgeable scientists in the field are notably silent. This includes Lipsitch at Harvard, Jonathan A. King at MITand many others.

Just last year, Lynn Klotz of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation wrote a paperin the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientistsentitled "Human Error in High-biocontainment Labs: A Likely Pandemic Threat." Wrote Klotz:

Incidents causing potential exposures to pathogens occur frequently in the high security laboratories often known by their acronyms, BSL3 (Biosafety Level 3) and BSL4. Lab incidents that lead to undetected or unreported laboratory-acquired infections can lead to the release of a disease into the community outside the lab; lab workers with such infections will leave work carrying the pathogen with them. If the agent involved were a potential pandemic pathogen, such a community release could lead to a worldwide pandemic with many fatalities. Of greatest concern is a release of a lab-created, mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, such as the airborne-transmissible H5N1 viruses created in the laboratories of Ron Fouchier in the Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kawaoka in Madison, Wisconsin.

"Crazy, dangerous"

Boyle, a professor of international law at the University of Illinois, has condemned Fouchier, Kawaoka and others including at least one of the authors of the recent Nature Medicine article in the strongest terms, calling such work a "criminal enterprise." While Boyle has been embroiled in numerous controversies, he's been especially dismissed by many on this issue. The "fact-checking" websiteSnopeshas described him as "a lawyer with no formal training in virology" without noting that he wrote the relevant U.S. law.

As Boyle saidin 2015:

Since September 11, 2001, we have spent around $100 billion on biological warfare. Effectively we now have an Offensive Biological Warfare Industry in this country that violates theBiological Weapons Conventionand myBiological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.

The law Boyle drafted states: "Whoever knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both. There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section committed by or against a national of the United States."

Boyle also warned:

Russia and China have undoubtedly reached the same conclusions I have derived from the same open and public sources, and have responded in kind. So what the world now witnesses is an all-out offensive biological warfare arms race among the major military powers of the world: United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel, inter alia.

We have reconstructed the Offensive Biological Warfare Industry that we had deployed in this county before its prohibition by the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, described by Seymour Hersh in his groundbreaking expose "Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal." (1968)

Boyle now states that he has been "blackballed" in the media on this issue, despite his having written the relevant statute. The group he worked with on the law, the Council for Responsible Genetics, went under several years ago, making Boyle's views against "biodefense" even more marginal as government money for dual use work poured into the field and criticswithin the scientific community have fallen silent. In turn, his denunciationshave grown more sweeping.

In the 1990 book "Preventing a Biological Arms Race," scholar Susan Wright argued that current laws regarding bioweapons were insufficient, as there were "projects in which offensive and defensive aspects can be distinguished only by claimed motive." Boyle notes, correctly, that current law he drafted does not makean exception for "defensive" work, but only for "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes."

While Boyle is particularly vociferous in his condemnations, he is not alone. There has been irregular, but occasional media attention to this threat. The Guardian ran a piece in 2014,"Scientists condemn 'crazy, dangerous' creation of deadly airborne flu virus," afterKawaoka created a life-threatening virus that "closely resembles the 1918 Spanish flu strain that killed an estimated 50m people":

"The work they are doing is absolutely crazy. The whole thing is exceedingly dangerous," said Lord May, the former president of the Royal Society and one time chief science adviser to the UK government. "Yes, there is a danger, but it's not arising from the viruses out there in the animals, it's arising from the labs of grossly ambitious people."

Boyle'scharges beginning early this yearthat the coronavirus was bioengineered allegationsrecently mirrored by French virologist andNobel laureate Luc Montagnier have not been corroborated by any publicly produced findings of any U.S. scientist. Boyle even charges that scientists like Ebright, who is at Rutgers, arecompromised because the university got abiosafety level 3 lab in 2017though Ebright is perhaps the most vocal eminent critic of this research, among U.S. scientists. These and other controversies aside, Boyle's concerns about the dangers of biowarfare arelegitimate; indeed, Ebright shares them.

Some of the most vocal voices to discuss the origins of the novel coronavirushave been eager to minimizethe dangers of lab work, or have focused almost exclusively on "wet markets" or "exotic" animals as the likely cause.

The media celebrated Laurie Garrett, the Pulitzer Prizewinning author and former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, when she declared on Twitter on March 3 (in a since-deleted tweet)that the origin of the pandemic was discovered: "It's pangolins. #COVID19 Researchers studied lung tissue from 12 of the scaled mammals that were illegally trafficked in Asia and found #SARSCoV2 in 3. The animals were found in Guangxi, China. Another virus+ smuggled sample found in Guangzhou."

She was swiftly corrected by Ebright: "Arrant nonsense. Did you even read the paper? Reported pangolin coronavirus is not SARS-CoV-2 and is not even particularly close to SARS-CoV-2. Bat coronavirus RaTG13 is much closer to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% identical) than reported pangolin coronavirus (92.4% identical)." He added: "No reason to invoke pangolin as intermediate. When A is much closer than B to C, in the absence of additional data, there is no rational basis to favor pathway A>B>C over pathway A>C." When someone asked what Garrett was saying, Ebright responded: "She is saying she is scientifically illiterate."

The following day, Garrett corrected herself (without acknowledging Ebright): "I blew it on the #Pangolins paper, & then took a few hours break from Twitter. It did NOT prove the species = source of #SARSCoV2. There's a torrent of critique now, deservedly denouncing me & my posting. A lot of the critique is super-informative so leaving it all up 4 while."

At leastone Chinese governmentofficialhas respondedto the allegation that the labs in Wuhan could be the source for the pandemic by alleging that perhaps the U.S. isresponsibleinstead. In American mainstreammedia, that has been reflexivelytreated as evenmore ridiculousthan the original allegation that the virus could havecome froma lab.

Obviouslythe Chinese government'sallegations should not be taken at face value, but neither should U.S. government claims especially considering that U.S. government labs were the apparent source for theanthrax attacks in 2001. Those attacks sent panic through the U.S. and shut down Congress, allowing the Bushadministration to enact the PATRIOT Act and ramp up the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, in October2001, media darlings like Richard Butler and Andrew Sullivan propagandizedfor war with Iraq because of the anthrax attacks. (Neither Iraq nor al-Qaida was involved.)

The 2001 anthrax attacks also provided muchof the pretext forthe surge in biolab spending since then, even though they apparently originated in a U.S. or U.S.-allied lab. Indeed, thoseattacks remain shrouded in mystery.

The U.S. government has also come up withelaborate cover stories to distract from its bioweapons work. For instance, the U.S. government infamously claimed the 1953 death of Frank Olson, a scientist at Fort Detrick, Maryland, was anLSD experiment gone wrong;it now appears to have been an execution to cover up for U.S.biological warfare.

Regardless of the cause of the current pandemic, these biowarfare/biodefense labs need far more scrutiny. The call to shut them down by Boyle and others needs to be clearly heard and light must be shone on precisely what research is being conducted.

The secrecy of these labs may prevent us ever knowing with certainty the origins of the current pandemic.What we do know is this kind of lab work comes with real dangers. One might make a comparison to climate change: We cannot attribute an individual hurricane to man-made climate disruption,yet science tells us that human activity makes stronger hurricanes more likely. Thatbrings us back to the imperative to cease the kinds of activities thatproduce such dangers in the first place.

If that doesn't happen, the people of the planet will be at the mercy of the machinations and mistakes of state actors who are playing with fire for their geopolitical interests.

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Did this virus come from a lab? Maybe not but it exposes the threat of a biowarfare arms race - Salon

Questions have been asked over China in recent days over how the coronavirus was made and transmitted from animal to human.

The US and the UK have both started investigations into China, with President Donald Trump questioning whether it was a mistake that got out of control or was it started deliberately.

Russia has taken advantage of the situation and had excess supplies of 60 tonnes of medical supplies which were sent to the US.

The Russian state of defence giant Rostec delivered ventilators, via the Kremlin to New York two weeks ago, despite Russia having severe health implications across the country.

The US President Donald Trump said, this is a very nice gesture and he is not worried about Russian propaganda, not even a little bit.

During the 70s the former Soviet Union (FSU) were creating genetic engineering for the next generation of Biological weapons as were the Chinese.

The FSU were accused of making a clandestine and illegal offensive biological weapons program. The Soviet Bioweapons (BW) research and development program also sought out the most contagious and lethal bacteria such as plague, and viruses like smallpox.

Biopreparat was a huge military program with civilian cover, which was organised to develop and weaponise biological agents for BW.

Biopreparat and other Soviet BW research facilities operated under the highest security classification of Special Importance which is higher than Top Secret.

The US intelligence community did not even know it existed until 1989 when a top-ranking scientist from the BW program defected to the UK.

In October 1989, Dr Vladimir Pasechnik, the first primary source from inside the Soviet program, defected to the UK.

Pasechnik disclosed that the Soviets had genetically engineered bacteria and viruses, weaponised the microbes in a powder form, loaded them onto various munitions, and integrated BW into their doctrine and had specific plans for use of BW.

In the spring of 1992, a lower-level bench scientist who had worked on plague research in Pasechniks lab also defected to the UK, he has remained undercover and is referred to by code name Temple Fortune.

He fully corroborated Pasechniks previous account and informed the British government on Russias genetic engineering.

A decade later, after becoming President of Russia, Boris Yeltsen visited Britain in 1992. In a public speech, discussing biological warfare research.

Yeltsin stated that the Russians had undertaken research on the influence of various substances on human genes.

The revolution in molecular biology may have incidentally unleashed a new threat to mankind, the development of deadly bioweapons.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, is the lead agency for disease epidemics and tracks naturally occurring emerging infectious diseases worldwide.

The CDC have travelled all over the world and investigated outbreaks of Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Marburg virus, hantavirus, and other emerging diseases, more recently coronavirus.

The US Office of the Secretary of Defense have identified countries that maintain various levels of offensive biological warfare capabilities or research facilities, this includes Russia and China.

Both Russia and China have been genetically engineering pathogens for Biological warfare for decades.

A pathogen may be released clandestinely so there will be a delay between exposure and onset of symptoms, such as coronavirus.

Days to weeks later, when people do develop symptoms, they could immediately start spreading contagious diseases, as the world has witnessed since January 2020 with Covid-19.

A paper, released in 2002 entitled, Next Generation Bioweapons for the USAF Counterproliferation Center which provided information and analysis to assist the understanding of bioweapons.

Colonel Dr Michael Ainscough, USAF and a diplomat of American Board of Preventive Medicine in Aerospace Medicine, said in the paper that entire viruses may similarly be created, analogous to the natural mutation of the influenza virus.

A new strain of influenza could be created by induced hybridisation of viral strains, simply swapping out variant or synthetic genes.

Slightly altering a common virus like influenza to make it deadlier might be easier than manipulating rarer or other biologically complicated pathogens.

Some animal viruses, such as those found in bats, are so small that their entire genome could be stitched together, to from machine-synthesised fragments using current technology.

Adding, Mycoplasma, an organism that causes pneumonia in humans, has the smallest known bacterial genome.

An existing pathogen would be subtly genetically modified to be more difficult to detect, more virulent, or more resistant to drugs, all within the capabilities of todays biotechnology, according to the paper.

China has also been developing such Mycoplasma bacterial genomes, and both Russia and China have been closely working with each other for decades.

The Chinese Army has a role at the Wuhan Institute for Biological Products and at the Wuhan Centre for Disease Control & Prevention.

The report by South Chinas university revealed the theory of the origin of coronavirus.

Surgery was performed on the caged animals and the tissue samples were collected for DNA and RNA extraction and sequencing.

They were only 280metresfrom the seafood market and the WHCDC was also adjacent to the Union Hospital where the first group of doctors were infected during this epidemic.

It is plausible that the virus leaked around and some of them contaminated the initial patients in this epidemic, though solid proof is needed in future studies.

Conservative MP, Tobias Elwood the chairman of the British Defence Select Committee expressed concerns in Febraury over the Chinese Armys role at the Wuhan Institute for Biological Products and called, for the greater transparency over the origins of the coronavirus.

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Scientists from Russia and China have been creating 'genetic pathogens' for years | London Business News - London Loves Business

Is there anything that can be done to escape the death cult we seem trapped in?

One of the more radical visions for how to organize human society begins with a simple goal: lets resurrect everyone who has ever lived. Nikolai Fedorov, a nineteenth-century librarian and Russian Orthodoxy philosopher, went so far as to call this project the common task of humanity, calling for the living to be rejuvenated, the dead to be resurrected, and space to be colonized specifically to house them. From the 1860s to the 1930s, Fedorovs influence was present throughout the culturehe influenced a generation of Marxists ahead of the Russian Revolution, as well as literary writers like Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky, whose novel, The Brothers Karamazov, directly engaged with Federov's ideas about resurrection.

After his death, Federovs acolytes consolidated his ideas into a single text, A Philosophy of the Common Task, and created Cosmism, the movement based on his anti-death eschatology. Federov left the technical details to those who would someday create the prerequisite technology, but this did not stop his disciples: Alexander Bogdanov, who founded the Bolsheviks with Lenin, was an early pioneer of blood transfusions in hopes of rejuvenating humanity; Konstantin Tsiolkvosky, an astrophysicist who was the progenitor of Russia's space program, sought to colonize space to house the resurrected dead; and Alexander Chizhevsky, a biophysicist who sought to map out the effects of solar activity on Earth life and behavior, thought his research might help design the ideal society for the dead to return to.

The vast majority of cosmists were, by the 1930s, either murdered or purged by Stalin, muting the influence of their ambitious project but also leaving us with an incomplete body of work about what type of society resurrection requires or will result in, and whether that wouldas some cosmists believe nowbring us closer to the liberation of the species. Now, I think it is obvious thatdespite what todays transhumanists might tell youwe are in no position, now or anytime soon, to resurrect anyone let alone bring back to life the untold billions that have existed across human history and past it into the eons before civilizations dawn.

To be clear, I think cosmism is absolute madness, but I also find it fascinating. With an introduction to Cosmism and its implications, maybe we can further explore the arbitrary and calculated parts of our social and political order that prioritize capital instead of humanity, often for sinister ends.

**

What? Who gets resurrected? And how?

At its core, the Common Task calls for the subordination of all social relations, productive forces, and civilization itself to the single-minded goal of achieving immortality for the living and resurrection for the dead. Cosmists see this as a necessarily universal project for either everyone or no one at all. That constraint means that their fundamental overhaul of society must go a step further in securing a place where evil or ill-intentioned people cant hurt anyone, but also where immortality is freely accessible for everyone.

Its hard to imagine how that worldwhere resources are pooled together for this project, where humans cannot hurt one another, and where immortality is freeis compatible with the accumulation and exploitation that sit at the heart of capitalism. The crisis heightened by coronavirus should make painfully clear to us all that, as J.W. Masonan economist at CUNYrecently put it, we have a system organized around the threat of withholding people's subsistence, and it "will deeply resist measures to guarantee it, even when the particular circumstances make that necessary for the survival of the system itself." Universal immortality, already an optimistic vision, simply cannot happen in a system that relies on perpetual commodification.

Take one small front of the original cosmist project: blood transfusions. In the 1920s, after being pushed out of the Bolshevik party, Bogdanov focused on experimenting with blood transfusions to create a rejuvenation process for humans (theres little evidence they do this). He tried and failed to set up blood banks across the Soviet Union for the universal rejuvenation of the public, dying from complications of a transfusion himself. Today, young blood is offered for transfusion by industrious start-ups, largely to wealthy and eccentric clientsmost notably (and allegedly) Peter Thiel.

In a book of conversations on cosmism published in 2017 titled Art Without Death, the first dialogue between Anton Vidokle and Hito Steyerl, living artists and writers in Berlin, drives home this same point. Vidokle tells Steyerl that he believes Death is capital quite literally, because everything we accumulatefood, energy, raw material, etc.these are all products of death. For him, it is no surprise were in a capitalist death cult given that he sees value as created through perpetual acts of extraction or exhaustion.

Steyerl echoes these concerns in the conversation, comparing the resurrected dead to artificial general intelligences (AGIs), which oligarch billionaires warn pose an existential threat to humanity. Both groups anticipate fundamental reorganizations of human society, but capitalists diverge sharply from cosmists in that their reorganization necessitates more extraction, more exhaustion, and more death. In their conversation, Steyerl tells Vidokle:

Within the AGI Debate, several solutions have been suggested: first to program the AGI so it will not harm humans, or, on the alt-right/fascist end of the spectrum, to just accelerate extreme capitalisms tendency to exterminate humans and resurrect rich people as some sort of high-net-worth robot race.

These eugenicist ideas are already being implemented: cryogenics and blood transfusions for the rich get the headlines, but the breakdown of healthcare in particularand sustenance in generalfor poor people is literally shortening the lives of millions ... In the present reactionary backlash, oligarchic and neoreactionary eugenics are in full swing, with few attempts being made to contain or limit the impact on the living. The consequences of this are clear: the focus needs to be on the living first and foremost. Because if we dont sort out societycreate noncapitalist abundance and so forththe dead cannot be resurrected safely (or, by extension, AGI cannot be implemented without exterminating humankind or only preserving its most privileged parts).

One of the major problems of todays transhumanist movement is that we are currently unable to equally distribute even basic life-extension technology such as nutrition, medicine, and medical care. At least initially, transhumanists vision of a world in which people live forever is one in which the rich live forever, using the wealth theyve built by extracting value from the poor. Todays transhumanism exists largely within a capitalist framework, and the countrys foremost transhumanist, Zoltan Istvan, a Libertarian candidate for president, is currently campaigning on a platform that shutdown orders intended to preserve human life during the coronavirus pandemic are overblown and are causing irrevocable damage to the capitalist economy (Istvan has in the past written extensively for Motherboard, and has also in the past advocated for the abolition of money).

Cosmists were clear in explaining what resurrection would look like in their idealized version of society, even though they were thin on what the technological details would be. Some argue we must not only restructure our civilization, but our bodies so that we can acquire regenerative abilities, alter our metabolic activity so food or shelter are optional, and thus overcome the natural, social, sexual, and other limitations of the species as Arseny Zhilyaev puts it in a later conversation within the book.

Zhilyaev also invokes Federovs conception of a universal museum, a radicalized, expanded, and more inclusive version of the museums we have now as the site of resurrection. In our world, the closest example of this universal museum is the digital world which also doubles as an enormous data collector used for anything from commerce to government surveillance. The prospect of being resurrected because of government/corporate surveillance records or Mormon genealogy databases is sinister at best, but Zhilyaevs argumentand the larger one advanced by other cosmistsis that our world is already full of and defined by absurd and oppressive institutions that are hostile to our collective interests, yet still manage to thrive. The options for our digital worlds development have been defined by advertisers, state authorities, telecom companies, deep-pocketed investors, and the likewhat might it look like if we decided to focus instead on literally any other task?

All this brings us to the question of where the immortal and resurrected would go. The answer, for cosmists, is space. In the cosmist vision, space colonization must happen so that we can properly honor our ethical responsibility to take care of the resurrected by housing them on museum planets. If the universal museum looks like a digital world emancipated from the demands of capital returns, then the museum planet is a space saved from the whims of our knock-off Willy Wonkasthe Elon Musks and Jeff Bezos of the world. I am not saying it is a good or fair idea to segregate resurrected dead people to museum planets in space, but this is what cosmists suggested, and its a quainter, more peaceful vision for space than what todays capitalists believe we should do.

For Musk, Mars and other future worlds will become colonies that require space mortgages, are used for resource extraction, or, in some cases, be used as landing spots for the rich once we have completely destroyed the Earth. Bezos, the worlds richest man, says we will have "gigantic chip factories in space where heavy industry is kept off-planet. Beyond Earth, Bezos anticipates humanity will be contained to O'Neill cylinder space colonies. One might stop and consider the fact that while the cosmist vision calls for improving human civilization on Earth before resurrecting the dead and colonizing space, the capitalist vision sees space as the next frontier to colonize and extract stupendous returns fromtrillions of dollars of resource extraction is the goal. Even in space, they cannot imagine humanity without the same growth that demands the sort of material extraction and environmental degradation already despoiling the world. Better to export it to another place (another country, planet, etc.) than fix the underlying system.

Why?

Ostensibly, the why behind cosmism is a belief that we have an ethical responsibility to resurrect the dead, much like we have one to care for the sick or infirm. At a deeper level, however, cosmists not only see noncapitalist abundance as a virtue in of itself, but believe the process of realizing it would offer chances to challenge deep-seated assumptions about humanity that might aid political and cultural forms hostile to the better future cosmists seek.

Vidokle tells Steyerl in their conversation that he sees the path towards resurrection involving expanding the rights of the dead in ways that undermine certain political and cultural forms,

The dead ... dont have any rights in our society: they dont communicate, consume, or vote and so they are not political subjects. Their remains are removed further and further from the cities, where most of the living reside. Culturally, the dead are now largely pathetical comical figures: zombies in movies, he said. Financial capitalism does not care about the dead because they do not produce or consume. Fascism only uses them as a mythical proof of sacrifice. Communism is also indifferent to the dead because only the generation that achieves communism will benefit from it; everyone who died on the way gets nothing.

In another part of their conversation, Steyerl suggests that failing to pursue the cosmist project might cede ground to the right-wing accelerationism already killing millions:

There is another aspect to this: the maintenance and reproduction of life is of course a very gendered technologyand control of this is on a social battleground. Reactionaries try to grab control over lifes production and reproduction by any means: religious, economic, legal, and scientific. This affects womens rights on the one hand, and, on the other, it spawns fantasies of reproduction wrested from female control: in labs, via genetic engineering, etc.

In other words, the failure to imagine and pursue some alternative to this oligarchic project has real-world consequences that not only kill human beings, but undermine the collective agency of the majority of humanity. In order for this narrow minority to rejuvenate and resurrect themselves in a way that preserves their own privilege and power, they will have to sharply curtail the rights and agency of almost every other human being in every other sphere of society.

Elena Shaposhnikova, another artist who appears later in the book, wonders whether the end of deathor the arrival of a project promising to abolish itmight help us better imagine and pursue lives beyond capitalism:

It seems to me that most of us tend to sublimate our current life conditions and all its problems, tragedies, and inequalities, and project this into future scenarios, she said. So while its easy to imagine and represent life in a society without money and with intergalactic travel, the plot invariably defaults to essentialist conflicts of power, heroism, betrayal, revenge, or something along these lines.

In a conversation with Shaposhnikova, Zhilyaev offers that cosmism might help fight the general fear of socialism as he understands it:

According to Marx, or even Lenin, socialism as a goal is associated with something elsewith opportunities of unlimited plurality and playful creativity, wider than those offered by capitalism. ... the universal museum producing eternal life and resurrection for all as the last necessary step for establishing social justice.

In the conversations that this book, cosmism emerges not simply as an ambition to resurrect the dead but to create, for the first time in human history, a civilization committed to egalitarianism and justice. So committed, in fact, that no part of the human experienceincluding deathwould escape the frenzied wake of our restructuring.

Its a nice thought, and something worth thinking about. Ours is not that world but in fact, one that is committed, above all else, to capital accumulation. There will be no resurrection for the deadthere isnt even healthcare for most of the living, after all. Even in the Citadel of Capital, the heart of the World Empire, the belly of the beast, the richest country in human history, most are expected to fend for themselves as massive wealth transfers drain the public treasuries that mightve funded some measure of protection from the pandemic, the economic meltdown, and every disaster lurking just out of sight. And yet, for all our plumage, our death cult still holds true to Adam Smith's observation in The Wealth of Nations: "All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind."

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The Proto-Communist Plan to Resurrect Everyone Who Ever Lived - VICE

Humanity is currently facing a huge challenge imposed by the coronavirus. Borders are being shut down, planes grounded, and factories closed. At the same time, scientists and public health professionals are working on tests, treatments, and vaccines to soon provide a medical response. Coping with corona might be one of the largest tests humans have faced in the past decades but it wont be the last virus we need to defeat. It is time to embrace bioscience and allow more research and applications of genetic alteration methods.

For the layman, all this technobabble about mutagenesis and genetic engineering is difficult to comprehend and it took me personally a good amount of reading to start grasping what different methods exist and how these can massively improve our quality of life.

Lets first look at the four most common ways to alter the genes of a plant or animal:

This can be even done in grown humans that are alive, which is a blessing for everyone who suffers from genetic disorders. We are able to repair genes in live organisms. Gene editing is also thousands of times more accurate than just bombarding seeds with radiation. Some applied examples are deactivating the gene responsible for generating gluten in wheat: The result is gluten-free wheat. There are several methods that achieve this. One of the most popular ones these days is the so-called CRISPR Cas-9. These scissors are usually reprogrammed bacteria that transmit the new gene information or deactivate defunct or unwanted genes. Many science fiction novels and movies show a future in which we can deactivate genetic defects and cure humans from terrible diseases. Some examples of stories in which CRISPR-like techniques have been used are movies such as GATTACA, Star Treks Wrath of Khan, or the Expanse series in which gene editing plays a crucial role in growing crops in space.

Synthetic biologists have started usingCRISPR to synthetically create partsof the coronavirus in an attempt to launch a vaccine against this lung disease and be able to mass-produce it very quickly. In combination with computer simulations and artificial intelligence, the best design for such a vaccine is calculated on a computer and then synthetically created. This speeds up vaccine development and cuts it from years to merely months. Regulators and approval bodies have shown that in times of crisis they can also rapidly approve new testing and vaccination procedures which usually require years of back and forth with agencies such as the FDA?

CRISPR also allows the search for specific genes, also genes of a virus. This helped researchersto build fast and simple testing proceduresto test patients for corona.

In the long term, gene editing might allow us to increase the immunity of humans by altering our genes and making us more resistant to viruses and bacteria.

While the coronavirus seems to really test our modern society, we also need to be aware that this wont be the last pathogen that has the potential to kill millions. If we are unlucky, corona might mutate quickly and become harder to fight. The next dangerous virus, fungus, or bacteria is probably around the corner. Hence we need to embrace the latest inventions of biotechnology and not block genetic research and the deployment of its findings.

Right now a lot of red tape and even outright bans are standing between lifesaving innovations such as CRISPR and patients around the world. We need to rethink our hostility towards genetic engineering and embrace it. To be frank: We are in a constant struggle to fight newly occurring diseases and need to be able to deploy state of the art human answers to this.

Fred Roeder is a Health Economist from Germany and has worked in healthcare reform in North America, Europe, and several former Soviet Republics. One of his passions is to analyze how disruptive industries and technologies allow consumers more choice at a lower cost. Follow him on Twitter @FredCyrusRoeder

A version of this article was originally published at Consumer Choice Center and has been republished here with permission. The center can be found on Twitter @ConsumerChoiceC

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What comic book super heroes and villains tell us about plant and human gene editing and the coronavirus - Genetic Literacy Project

An unprecedented amount of research has been focused solely on understanding the novel coronavirus that has taken nearly 150,000 lives across the globe. And while scientists have gotten to know some of the most intimate details of the virus called SARS-CoV-2, one question has evaded any definitive answers Where did the virus come from?

Live Science contacted several experts, and the reality, they said, is that we may never know where this deadly coronavirus originated. Among the theories circulating: That SARS-CoV-2 arose naturally, after passing from bats to a secondary animal and then to humans; that it was deliberately engineered and then accidentally released by humans; or that researchers were studying a naturally-occurring virus that subsequently escaped from a high-security biolab, the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China. The head of the lab at WIV, for her part, has emphatically denied any link to the institute.

Just today (April 18), the vice director of WIV Zhiming Yuan CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster, said "there is no way this virus came from us," NBC News reported. "We have a strict regulatory regime and code of conduct of research, so we are confident."

Furthermore, the notion that SARS-CoV-2 was genetically engineered is pure conspiracy, experts told Live Science, but it's still impossible to rule out the notion that Chinese scientists were studying a naturally-occurring coronavirus that subsequently "escaped" from the lab. To prove any of these theories takes transparent data and information, which is reportedly not happening in China, scientists say. Several experts have said to Live Science and other media outlets have reported that the likeliest scenario is that SARS-CoV-2 is naturally occurring.

Related: 13 coronavirus myths busted by science

"Based on no data, but simply [a] likely scenario is that the virus went from bats to some mammalian species, currently unknown despite speculation, [and] spilled over to humans," said Gerald Keusch, associate director of the Boston University National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories. This spillover event may have happened before the virus found its way into a live animal market, "which then acted as an amplifying setting with many more infections that subsequently spread and the rest is history," Keusch said. "The timeline is fuzzy and I don't think we have real data to say when these things began, in large part because the data are being held back from inspection," Keusch told Live Science.

The SARS-CoV-2 virus is most closely related to coronaviruses found in certain populations of horseshoe bats that live about 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) away in Yunnan province, China. The first known outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in humans occurred in Wuhan and initially was traced to a wet seafood market (which sold live fish and other animals), though some of the earliest cases have no link to that market, according to research published Feb. 15 in the journal The Lancet.

Related: 11 (sometimes) deadly diseases that hopped across species

What's more, despite several proposed candidates, from snakes to pangolins to dogs, researchers have failed to find a clear "intermediate host" an animal that would have served as a springboard for SARS-CoV-2 to jump from bats to humans. And if horseshoe bats were the primary host, how did the bat virus hop from its natural reservoir in a subtropical region to the bustling city of Wuhan hundreds of miles away?

These questions have led some people to look elsewhere in the hunt for the virus's origin, and some have focused on the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV).

In 2015, WIV became China's first lab to reach the highest level of bioresearch safety, or BSL-4, meaning the lab could host research on the world's most dangerous pathogens, such as Ebola and Marburg viruses. (SARS-CoV-2 would require a BSL-3 or higher, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.) Labs like these must follow strict safety guidelines that include filtering air, treating water and waste before they exit, and requiring lab personnel to shower and change their clothes before and after entering the facility, Nature News reported in 2017.

These types of labs do spur concerns among some scientists who worry about the risks involved and the potential impact on public health if anything were to go wrong, Nature News reported.

Related: The 12 deadliest viruses on Earth

WIV was not immune to those concerns. In 2018, after scientist diplomats from the U.S. embassy in Beijing visited the WIV, they were so concerned by the lack of safety and management at the lab that the diplomats sent two official warnings back to the U.S. One of the official cables, obtained by The Washington Post, suggested that the lab's work on bat coronaviruses with the potential for human transmission could risk causing a new SARS-like pandemic, Post columnist Josh Rogin wrote.

"During interactions with scientists at the WIV laboratory, they noted the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory," the officials said in their cable dated to Jan. 19, 2018.

When reports of the coronavirus first popped up in China, the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger reportedly suspected a potential link to China labs. In mid-January, according to a New York Times report, Pottinger asked intelligence agencies like the C.I.A., particularly individuals with expertise on Asia and weapons of mass destruction, to investigate this idea. They came up empty-handed, the Times reported.

Meanwhile, the lab at the center of these speculations had long been sounding the alarm about the risk of the SARS-like coronaviruses they studied to spawn a pandemic.

The head of the lab's bat-coronavirus research, Shi Zhengli, published research on Nov. 30, 2017 in the journal PLOS Pathogens that traced the SARS coronavirus pandemic in 2003 to a single population of horseshoe bats in a remote cave in Yunnan province. The researchers also noted that other SARS-like coronaviruses discovered in that cave used the ACE2 receptor to infect cells and could "replicate efficiently in primary human airway cells," they wrote. (Both SARS and SARS-CoV-2 use the ACE2 receptor as the entry point into cells.)

Zhengli and her colleagues stressed the importance of monitoring and studying the SARS coronaviruses to help prevent another pandemic.

"Thus, we propose that monitoring of SARS-CoV evolution at this and other sites should continue, as well as examination of human behavioral risk for infection and serological surveys of people, to determine if spillover is already occurring at these sites and to design intervention strategies to avoid future disease emergence," they wrote.

Related: 20 of the worst epidemics and pandemics in history

The WIV lab, along with researchers in the U.S. and Switzerland, showed in 2015 the scary-good capability of bat coronaviruses to thrive in human cells. In that paper, which was published in 2015 in the journal Nature Medicine, they described how they had created a chimeric SARS-like virus out of the surface spike protein of a coronavirus found in horseshoe bats, called SHC014, and the backbone of a SARS virus that could be grown in mice. The idea was to look at the potential of coronaviruses circulating in bat populations to infect humans. In a lab dish, the chimeric coronavirus could infect and replicate in primary human airway cells; the virus also was able to infect lung cells in mice.

That study was met with some pushback from researchers who considered the risk of that kind of research to outweigh the benefits. Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, was one of those scientists. Wain-Hobson emphasized the fact that this chimeric virus "grows remarkably well" in human cells, adding that "If the virus escaped, nobody could predict the trajectory," Nature News reported.

None of this can show the provenance of SARS-CoV-2.

But scientists can start to rule out an idea that the pandemic-causing coronavirus was engineered in that lab or further created as a bioweapon. Researchers say the overwhelming evidence indicates this is a natural-borne virus that emerged from an animal host, likely a bat, and was not engineered by humans.

Related: 28 devastating infectious diseases

"This origin story is not currently supported at all by the available data," said Adam Lauring, an associate professor of microbiology, immunology and infectious diseases at the University of Michigan Medical School. Lauring pointed to a study published March 17 in the journal Nature Medicine, which provided evidence against the idea that the virus was engineered in a lab.

In that Nature medicine study one of the strongest rebukes of this idea Kristian Andersen, an associate professor of immunology and microbiology at Scripps Research, and his colleagues analyzed the genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 and coronaviruses in animals. They found that a key part of SARS-CoV-2, the spike protein that the virus uses to attach to ACE2 receptors on the outsides of human cells, would almost certainly have emerged in nature and not as a lab creation.

"This analysis of coronavirus genome sequences from patients and from various animals suggests that the virus likely arose in an animal host and then may have undergone further changes once it transmitted and circulated in people," Lauring told Live Science.

That may rule out deliberate genetic engineering, but what about other scenarios that point to bats as the natural hosts, but WIV as the source of the outbreak?

Although researchers will likely continue to sample and sequence coronaviruses in bats to determine the origin of SARS-CoV-2, "you can't answer this question through genomics alone," said Dr. Alex Greninger, an assistant professor in the Department of Laboratory Medicine and an assistant director of the Clinical Virology Laboratory at the University of Washington Medical Center. That's because it's impossible to definitively tell whether SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a lab or from nature based on genetics alone. For this reason, it's really important to know which coronaviruses were being studied at WIV. "It really comes down to what was in the lab," Greninger told Live Science.

However, Lauring said that based on the Nature Medicine paper, "the SARS-CoV-2 virus has some key differences in specific genes relative to previously identified coronaviruses the ones a laboratory would be working with. This constellation of changes makes it unlikely that it is the result of a laboratory 'escape,'" he said.

As for what viruses were being studied at WIV, Zhengli says she did a thorough investigation. When she first was alerted to the viral outbreak in Wuhan on the night of Dec. 30, 2019, Zhengli immediately put her lab to work sequencing the genomes of SARS-CoV-2 from infected patients and comparing the results with records of coronavirus experiments in her lab. She also looked for any mishandling of viral material used in any experiments, Scientific American reported. She didn't find any match between the viruses her team was working with from bat caves and those found in infected patients. "That really took a load off my mind," she told Scientific American. "I had not slept a wink for days."

At the beginning of February, Zhengli sent a note over WeChat to reassure her friends that there was no link, saying "I swear with my life, [the virus] has nothing to do with the lab," the South China Morning Post reported Feb. 6. Zhengli and another colleague, Peng Zhou, did not reply to a Live Science email requesting comment.

The Wuhan lab does work with the closest known relative of SARS-CoV-2, which is a bat coronavirus called RaTG13, evolutionary virologist Edward Holmes, of the Charles Perkins Center and the Marie Bashir Institute for Infectious Diseases and Biosecurity at the University of Sydney, said in a statement from the Australian Media Center. But, he added, "the level of genome sequence divergence between SARS-CoV-2 and RaTG13 is equivalent to an average of 50 years (and at least 20 years) of evolutionary change." (That means that in the wild, it would take about 50 years for these viruses to evolve to be as different as they are.)

Though no scientists have come forth with even a speck of evidence that humans knowingly manipulated a virus using some sort of genetic engineering, a researcher at Flinders University in South Australia lays out another scenario that involves human intervention. Bat coronaviruses can be cultured in lab dishes with cells that have the human ACE2 receptor; over time, the virus will gain adaptations that let it efficiently bind to those receptors. Along the way, that virus would pick up random genetic mutations that pop up but don't do anything noticeable, said Nikolai Petrovsky, in the College of Medicine and Public Health at Flinders.

"The result of these experiments is a virus that is highly virulent in humans but is sufficiently different that it no longer resembles the original bat virus," Petrovsky said in a statement from the Australian Media Center. "Because the mutations are acquired randomly by selection, there is no signature of a human gene jockey, but this is clearly a virus still created by human intervention."

If that virus infected a staff member and that person then traveled to the nearby seafood market, the virus could have spread from there, he said. Or, he added, an "inappropriate disposal of waste from the facility" could have infected humans directly or from a susceptible intermediary, such as a stray cat.

Though we may never get a definitive answer, at least in the near-term, some say it doesn't matter.

"No matter the origin, evolution in nature and spillover to humans, accidental release from a lab, or deliberate release or genetic manipulation of a pathogen in the lab the way you develop countermeasures is the same," Keusch told Live Science. "Since one can never say 100% for anything, I think we always need to be aware of all possibilities in order to contravene. But the response to develop what is needed to respond, control and eliminate the outbreak remains the same."

Live Science senior writer Rachael Rettner contributed to this report.

Originally published on Live Science.

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Wuhan lab says there's no way coronavirus originated there. Here's the science. - Livescience.com

As a major vector for disease, the mosquito has harmed more human beings than just about any other animal, and a changing climate is only boosting those numbers. As the range of disease-carrying species of mosquitoes expands, so does their ability to transmit the parasites and viruses that result in malaria, chikungunya, Zika, yellow fever, West Nile, and dengue fever. In 2018, the continental United States saw a 25 percent increase in severe, neuroinvasive cases of West Nile virus compared with a decade earlier. And over the past three decades, the CDC reports, the worldwide incidence of dengue fever has risen 30-fold.

In cities with well-maintained infrastructure, mosquito populations can be kept in check by minimizing standing water and treating high-risk areas like storm drains. Elsewhere, lowering the risk carried by the creature that the World Health Organization describes as one of the deadliest animals in the world" comes with its own set of complications, including new dangers to the health of humans, other species, and the ecosystems that they depend on. Heres a short guide to the complicated science of mitigating that risk.

Pupae of Aedes mosquitoes at the Insect Pest Control Laboratory located at the FAO/IAEA Agriculture and Biotechnology Laboratories in Seibersdorf near Vienna. | Photo Courtesy of Jesus Reyes/IAEA

Insecticides

In our efforts to preserve health, reduce nuisance, and protect crops and livestock, human beings have a long history of trying to suppress insect populations. The practice of poisoning insects can be traced all the way from 2000 BCE Mesopotamia, when people dusted crops with sulfur, to our modern use of synthetic and natural pesticides. That long history means that mosquitoes have had plenty of opportunity to evolve a resistance to those chemicals, and those chemicalsmost notably DDThave had similar opportunity to accumulate in the environment and threaten other species. In recent years, mosquitoes have developed resistance to four common classes of insecticides. Insecticide-treated nets can reduce the incidence of malaria by nearly half, but (rising rates of resistance notwithstanding) some communities repurpose them as fishing nets, which indiscriminately trap all sizes of fish and pollute the water with insecticide.

Sterilization

In response to the growing global burden of mosquito-borne diseases and the above-mentioned problems with insecticides, the World Health Organization, in partnership with other United Nations branches (including a collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency on safety standards and risk assessment frameworks), are turning to the Sterile Insect Technique (SIT), which has been used to combat agricultural pests for more than 60 years in more than 40 countries. In this relatively straightforward method, male insects of a particular species (male insects arent the problemonly the females transmit disease and lay eggs on crops) are bred en masse in a lab, then sterilized via radiation. The sterile males are then released by drone in a community, where theyll matebut fail to reproducewith females, thus reducing the population.

Later this year, field trials will begin to evaluate the effectiveness of SIT against Aedes aegypti mosquitoes and the diseases they transmit. Field trials will take place at preapproved sites in approximately 10 countries.

SITs track record in reducing target insect populations without causing significant harm to the environment make it a promising tool. However, the same radiation that renders the mosquitoes sterile can also make them less healthy, allowing their wild (and fertile) counterparts to outcompete them. Furthermore, the scale production thats necessary to reduce large populations of sterilized mosquitoes is enormous and may be difficult to attain or maintain.

Genetically Self-limited

Another approach to withering mosquito populations is genetic editing. In its latest efforts, UK-based companyOxitec inserts self-limiting dominant lethal genes that pass on to subsequent generations of offspring. The edited gene causes female progeny to die before reaching adulthood, but allows males to survive and pass along the lethal gene to half of their offspring. While it still targets population numbers, this technology addresses one of the feasibility issues associated with SIT. Mosquito populations decline over multiple generations, so one introduction has a more sustained effect, yet as the population falls, the edited gene eventually disappears.

The big gain to be had from reducing populations of target mosquitoeswhether via sterilization or genetic modificationis that they should also suppress transmission of all the viruses that the species carries. There are roughly 3,500 species of mosquito in the world and only a handfulmostly within the Anopholes, Aedes, and Culex generacarry the viruses and parasites that cause diseases such as malaria and dengue. Remove the carriers and its likely that other insects with fill in their niche in the ecosystem.

Animals that consume mosquitoes dont appear to rely exclusively on a single species, or even solely on one type of insect. Decades of success with SIT in agriculture support this idea, says WHO Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases researcher Florence Fouque: These predators eat plenty of different insects, so if you suppress the mosquitoes, they eat other insects. For example, in a 20092010 study, researchers examined prey DNA in the fecal matter collected from five species of bats in Australia. Though bats are often touted as heavily dependent on mosquitoes, the scientists found that mosquitoes represented a small proportion of the diet, even for the smallest bats, and that the bats were consuming a wide variety of species of mosquito beyond those that carry malaria.

The Replacement Strategy

At Colorado State Universitys Arthropod-borne and Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Kenneth Olson is working to replace the most disease-carrying mosquitoes instead of eliminating them. For roughly 15 years, he has been developing genetically modified mosquitoes that he hopes will one day replace wild type Aedes aegypti in particular environments. We (and others) have developed transgenic Aedes aegypti that are highly resistant to dengue and Zika viruses, at least in the laboratory, says Olson. The goal of this and similar gene drive projects is to eventually introduce these (male) mosquitoes into a natural environment, where they will breed with wild females and spread the gene that provides disease resistance into the unmodified population. The advantage of a replacement strategy is that we wouldnt eliminate Aedes aegyptiif that bothers peoplebut instead replace the population with mosquitoes that have a virus-resistant phenotype, Olson explains.

Gene editings proponents argue its still effective and less destructive to beneficial insects and other species than the most common alternative: insecticides. Insecticides as a basis of vector control, they are bad for the environment and may affect beneficial insect populations. Further, insecticide treatments can be expensive, and mosquitoes are evolving resistance, Olson says.

But gene drives also have their detractors. Once engineered mosquitoes are removed from the closed conditions of a lab, additional uncontrolled mutations may occur. And, in fact, while field trials of Oxitecs first generation of Friendly Aedes aegypti did demonstrate a substantial reduction in the local mosquito population, they also found a surprise. Reporting on an independent study, Kelly Servick wrote for Science magazine that between 5 and 60 percent of the insects collected in the months after the trial had some DNA from the Oxitec strain in their genome. Though lab studies indicated that about 3 percent of the engineered mosquitoes offspring would survive, field trials demonstrated that they could reproduce and pass pieces of their genomes to subsequent generations. While none of the modified genes were passed on, this does support concerns about our ability to anticipate how things will play out in the natural environment.

Which is, arguably, the very point of the multiphased approach. Before field trials even begin, researchers must demonstrate success for generations in the labone line of mosquitoes has been in Olsons insectary since 2009 (thats 54 generations), and it remains highly resistant to the targeted arbovirus. And once they are launched, they are overseen and carried out in conjunction with host countries, local communities, and in the case of the SIT trials, multiple agencies. In its guidance frameworks for studying the efficacy and safety of various biotechnologies (including genetically manipulated mosquitoes and SIT), the WHO emphasizes the safety of nontarget organisms, responsible community engagement, and more. Gene drive engineering like Olson does is still relatively new and has yet to undergo any field trials, and guidelines for best practices are still being developed. For Olson, a key factor in protecting both the quality of research and the communities most affected by disease will be promoting transparency within the scientific community and with the public.

With the aim of eventually sterilizing and releasing them into the wild, male larvae are reared in laboratory-controlled environments. | Photo Courtesy of Dean Calma/IAEA

Is There a Better Way?

For many, including Olson and Fouque, biotechnology represents a safer and more efficient strategy for combating mosquito-borne diseases when compared with the insecticides that dominate today. Critics of biotechnology and especially genetic engineering are more likely to see it as an uncontrolled ecological experiment with too many unanticipated consequences for the environment and would rather see the energy and funding shift in different directions.

And, in fact, that research is happening as well. Scientists are developing biopesticides made from fungi; studying the efficacy of combating malaria with insecticides and antiparasitics made from nanoparticles (structures ranging from 10 to 100 nm in size) of gold, silver, and other elements; and infecting mosquitoes with a naturally occurring bacteria, Wolbachia, to reduce their lifespan and ability to transmit pathogens. Fish, tadpoles, and other aquatic animals have been shown to drastically reduce populations of mosquito larvae, though the extent to which this ends up affecting transmission remains unclear.

However, much of this work comes with the potential for unanticipated effects. Targeted biopesticides might be safer for other species threatened by conventional pesticides, but don't solve concerns raised above about how this could affect bats, birds, frogs, and other predators. Nanoparticles already occur in nature, but their impact on aquatic environments has been understudied and, as with pesticides, there is the risk of accumulation-related environmental toxicity. Even introducing natural predators to eat mosquitoes can shift ecological balance in unpredictable ways. For example, since mosquitoes represent a small proportion of birds' and bats diets, adding more predators could unintentionally lower populations of moths, beetles, and the other insects those predators consume.

With an array of potential solutions that are as complex as the environments in which they may ultimately be rolled out, no one solution will be perfect. Weve already put our collective thumbs on the scale, introducing mosquito species to new regions, creating conditions in which they flourish, and trying to combat them with sweepingly toxic insecticides. Now its just a question of how to do the least harm.

Note: This article is independent of the Sierra Clubs policy regarding biotechnology, which opposes field release of GMOs unless they are proven safe.

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Can We Kill the Dreaded Mosquito? - Sierra Magazine