How terrorist groups and other violent non-state actors treat civilians can significantly affect how long such groups will last. As the militant group Ansar al-Sunna (ASWJ) actively expands its area of operations outside the occupied port town of Mocmboa da Praia in northern Mozambique, the insurgencys treatment of civilians warrants attention.
To date, ASWJs strategy has been notably inconsistent, fluctuating between hearts and minds and shock and awe. Understanding ASWJs approach towards civilians is critical to providing them with adequate protection, as well as to crafting effective counterinsurgency measures against the group.
Civilians continue to shoulder the brunt of the insurgencys success. More than 309,000 Mozambicans are internally displaced, largely due to the conflict in the north. As insurgent control over roads increases, many fleeing civilians consider maritime routes to be the safest option, resulting in capsized ships and deaths at sea.
Hundreds of thousands are also food insecure. The UNs Famine Early Warning Systems Network has declared crisis-level food insecurity in the north, exacerbating pre-existing chronic hunger. Cabo Delgado province, the insurgencys epicenter, has the countrys second-highest rate of chronic malnutrition.
On top of this, ASWJ has blocked access to basic services, including electricity, education, and medical care.
At times, ASWJ appears to employ a hearts and minds strategy in an attempt to gain the populations support for tactical purposes (such as human intelligence), recruitment, and overall sustainability of the insurgency.
This strategy involves de-legitimizing the national government and its monopolization of the use of force to justify ASWJs actions and create a common enemy in the state.
Two important components of this strategy are the provision of services and the targeting of the state, such as infrastructure and personnel. For example, on April 7, ASWJ raided a World Food Programme-affiliated food warehouse and distributed its contents to the local population.
In another incident, insurgents distributed stolen medicine and fuel to residents perceived to be loyal. ASWJ has frequently targeted state assets, including administrative buildings, military posts, police stations, and state workers.
Additionally, on several occasions, the group has warned civilians of impending attacks and instructed them to leave the area. This was the case in March 2020 when ASWJ attackers warned residents of Quissanga about an upcoming attack on Mocmboa da Praia. Seven months later, the group gave poorer older civilians in the coastal areas of Macomia District $125 to flee impending attacks.
At other times, ASWJ appears to employ a shock and awe strategy. The group exercises control and seeks to build legitimacy and notoriety by creating fear, utilizing violence, and projecting power. This primarily manifests as violent attacks against civilians, mass casualty attacks, and the deprivation of basic services.
ASWJ has prevented basic services and necessary medications from reaching some areas in northern Mozambique. In Cabo Delgado province, one of the countrys pandemic hotspots, this has complicated the governments response to COVID-19.
Additionally, the group has carried out mass attacks and executed a campaign of violence against civilians, irrespective of age. Most notably, it executed over 50 individuals in Xitaxi in Muidumbe District after some locals refused to join the group.
Other recent attacks, although smaller in scale, include the beheadings of seven civilians on September 24 and a six-person family, including two children, on September 26. In each of these incidents, along with numerous other attacks, property was destroyed or stolen.
ASWJs strategy towards civilians has been strikingly inconsistent, making it difficult to assess its broader strategic aims.
Are they intentionally combining these strategies in the hopes of gaining recruits through popular support while simultaneously inducing concessions from the state through violence? Are they trying to command civilian respect through fear or coerce it through the distribution of minor services? If the group becomes more intimately tied to the Islamic States Central Africa Province, will they take a staunch hearts and minds or shock and awe stance?
These questions are yet to be answered, but with regard to the Islamic State, its treatment of civilians is not uniform across its factions. Thus, a stronger affiliation with Islamic State Central Africa Province will not inherently necessitate a shock and awe strategy. The Islamic State West Africa Province provides a good example: the group largely pursues a hearts and mind strategy on Lake Chad, which has contributed to its longevity.
Overall, tracking and better understanding of ASWJs approach to civilians will allow for more effective counterinsurgency and the protection of local populations.
Kelly Moss is an African Maritime Security Researcher at Stable Seas, a program of One Earth Future. Her research and publication background focuses on terrorism and substate violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Kelly graduated from Georgetown Universitys School of Foreign Service, where she received her masters degree in Security Studies, and has worked at three U.S. federal government agencies, including the Bureau of African Affairs at the Department of State.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.
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